

HAROLD D. LASSWELL'S LEGACY TO MAINSTREAM POLITICAL SCIENCE: A Neglected Agenda

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ABSTRACT

Harold D. Lasswell's extensive and wide-ranging books and essays are extraordinarily rich sources of ideas, methods, and topics for the study of political behavior. Whether and how the legacy of his writings is used by contemporary political scientists and theorists is reported here by way of an investigation of references to his work appearing in mainstream political science journals (available through JSTOR) for the 17 years following the end of his academic career. We find that most references to Lasswell are superficial (perfunctory, suggestive, deferential), although a few are more substantial (critical, extending). We conclude that Lasswell's legacy is today undervalued and underused, to the discipline's detriment.

INTRODUCTION

"If you want a book to become a 'classic,'" Harold Lasswell once told Heinz Eulau, "there are two strategies.¹ One strategy is to have it published in very small quantity by an obscure university press that has no budget for advertising. That will soon make your book an addition to a 'rare book room' in some university library and guarantee something out of it being repeatedly quoted

¹Lasswell was strong on "strategy" long before game theory invaded the social sciences. It was a word he had undoubtedly picked up as a close student of another great scholar, Lenin, who had applied it to the politics of the class struggle and revolution. But that is another story.

without having been read, like Havelock Ellis on sexuality.”² Lasswell grinned, sniffed his after-dinner Courvoisier, and had a sip before going on. “The other strategy is to mass-market your opus. A notorious Athenian, Socrates by name, was rather good at that. Originally his messages were spread by word of mouth, until some entrepreneur by the name of Plato—one of his students—came along, and then there was no end to the fame of *The Republic*. The great virtue of this strategy is that this kind of stuff [another favorite Lasswell expression] does not require any attribution.”

That Harold Dwight Lasswell was, during his lifetime, an omnipresence as the most original and eminent of political scientists is beyond doubt. The eulogies upon his death in 1978 were ecstatic, as befits a “living legend.” Lasswell’s memorials are also noteworthy for their predictions of his continuing importance. [For a compilation of eulogies, see *Harold Dwight Lasswell, 1902–1978: In Commemoration and Continuing Commitment* (Yale Law School 1979).] Lasswell’s extensive and wide-ranging books, essays, and other publications remain extraordinarily rich sources of ideas, methods, and topics for the study of political behavior. Those ideas, methods, and topics—i.e. the substance of his “classic” writings—are his legacy. Whether and how that legacy has been substantively used by subsequent political scientists is the question that kindles our curiosity here.³

How does one go about determining the fruition of a prolific scholar’s legacy, regardless of which “strategy” lifted his works to the status of “classic”? A count of the lines or inches devoted to Lasswell’s name in the *Social Science Citation Index*, for example, yields far fewer references than we would expect—not that he aspired to become a *SSCI* superstar. Besides, we do not believe that the reputation of a person, especially if departed, is a function of so simple a measure as number of citations. On the contrary, intellectual influence is sometimes so pervasive and encompassing that attribution is unnecessary. As Alfred North Whitehead advised,⁴

²In the United States, until 1935, Ellis’s works were legally available only to the medical profession. According to the Encyclopedia Britannica’s *Micropaedia* (III:860), “a legal dispute over [a volume of Ellis’s *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*] led the judge...to call claims for the book’s scientific value ‘a pretense, adopted for the purpose of selling a filthy publication....’ Ellis’s work helped to foster open discussion of sexual problems, and he became known as a champion of women’s rights and of sex education.” Although Lasswell was not a learned practitioner of medicine, he evidently had access to Ellis’s books and relied on them.

³We are not about to launch another rehearsal of Lasswell’s personal and intellectual biography or a tedious explication of his political science. There exist two excellent essays written before his death in 1978 (Smith 1969, Marvick 1977) and another of more recent vintage (Muth 1990). The Muth volume is primarily an annotated bibliography of Lasswell’s writings but also includes a long list of “analytical,” biographical, and “further” references to his work.

⁴Lasswell once acknowledged that his own terminology “owes something to the Cambridge Logical School, and especially to A.N. Whitehead. The debt is evident in the use of such expressions as ‘event’ and ‘event manifold’” (Lasswell [1939] 1948b:195).

When you are criticizing the philosophy of an epoch, do not chiefly direct your attention to those intellectual positions which its exponents feel it necessary explicitly to defend. There will be some fundamental assumptions which adherents of all the various systems within the epoch unconsciously presuppose. Such assumptions appear so obvious that people do not know what they are assuming because no other way of putting things has ever occurred to them. With these assumptions a certain limited number of types of philosophic systems are possible, and this group of systems constitutes the philosophy of an epoch. (Whitehead 1948:49–50)

When a Lasswellian *piece de resistance* is cited, what usually gets quoted (we might add, ad nauseam) is either “who gets what, when, and how” or the clinical formula known as the displacement hypothesis, which, he told us, “expresses the developmental facts about the fully developed political man”:

$$p \} d \} r = P,$$

where p = private motives, d = displacement onto a public object, r = rationalization in terms of the public interest, P = the political man, and $\}$ signifies “is transformed into” (1930:75).

Not often cited are other Lasswellian adages, like this brash proverb from the book that made Lasswell notorious in the established circles of his time (*Psychopathology and Politics*):

Political science without biography is a form of taxidermy. (1930:1)

Or the first sentence in his most original book, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity*:

Political analysis is the study of changes in the shape and composition of the value patterns of society. (1935:3)

Or the “premature” formula of the “social process” that should make every rationally inclined neo-institutionalist’s mouth water:

Man
pursues *Values*
through *Institutions*
on *Resources*. (1948a:17)

Or, finally, the triumphant welcome to the dawning age of computer-guided policy making:

....even in an automatizing world some top-level choices must be made. In that sense at least discretion is here to stay. (1955:399)

Although absolute and relative numbers of attributions are suggestive and thus of interest (we report some below), our peek at Lasswell’s legacy to political science—whether and how it has been substantively used—rests on an examination of the context of those attributions.

READING LASSWELL BACKWARD

An intellectual legacy, unlike a pot of gold, is not constant in nature. We read our intellectual heroes backward—from the perspective of our own interests and curiosities rather than from the perspective of the legator. We pick and choose from the “objective” legacy only what seems relevant as our own interests change. At times, we may even read into an earlier work what we need to find for our own work. And the more diverse and comprehensive the earlier source is, the more likely it is to be interpreted and reinterpreted, used and misused, picked at and sifted. Such has been the fate of Lasswell’s legacy, a particularly wide-ranging and equally suggestive body of work by an especially ecumenical social scientist (see Muth 1990 for Lasswell’s extensive bibliography).

Our survey thus turns on a simple question: If one knows about Lasswell only by reading the citations or references to him in the political science literature, what does his legacy seem to be? (We suggest that the more technically inclined reader repair to the Appendix, where we spell out our investigative procedures.)

A BOTTOMLESS BOTTOM LINE

Before detailing what we retrieved as tapped, praised, cherished, critiqued, misplaced, or abused, a look at the “bottom line” is appropriate. Lasswell’s legacy is undervalued and underemployed. Frankly, we were disappointed not to find more and better utilization of the rich intellectual heritage Lasswell left behind.

We think it not accidental that of Lasswell’s books the most frequently referenced (with only 15 mentions) is *Power and Society* (1950), which in many respects is not a book at all but an inventory of definitions and propositions that are easily lifted for literary exploitation without requiring the reading of anything else in the volume (for instance, its illuminating introduction, which deals with “political science, philosophy, and policy” and “political inquiry”). The next most often cited book, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How* (1936), with 14 mentions, is the most accessible of Lasswell’s books (heavily edited and possibly rewritten by one of Lasswell’s most devoted students). Its title provides a conveniently concise and flashy definition of politics. The absence of citations to particular pages strongly suggests that the book has far fewer actual readers than admirers of its title. What has survived from *Psychopathology and Politics* (1930), referenced 11 times, is largely some restatement—sometimes correct, sometimes incorrect—of the displacement hypothesis, an obviously suggestive target for latter-day riposte. But these numbers are of interest mainly when contrasted with the mere five references to

Lasswell's most seminal and extended work, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (1935). Although this book is intellectually complex and difficult to read, it not only reflects what Lasswell conceived in the first decade of his professional life but also anticipates almost all of his later formulations and deliberations on power, revolution, institutions, context, configurative analysis, developmental constructs, elites and symbols, values, decision making, and more.

Of Lasswell's other major works, *Power and Personality* (1948a) was referenced six times and the coauthored *Power, Corruption, and Rectitude* (Rogow & Lasswell 1963) four times. The essay "Democratic Character" (1951) was alluded to twice, and another nine sundry items were each mentioned once. Two works presumably of particular interest to political scientists, *The Future of Political Science* (1963) and *A Pre-View of Policy Sciences* (1971), did not appear among references or citations in the 75 JSTOR articles.

Suffice it to say that of the references to Lasswell's name and works that we record in the following five categories, few are substantial. In some cases there is no citation at all from the book referenced, or the citation does not specify the page where the quotation is presumably located, or the citation is not to the original edition of the book.

Perfunctory Treatment

Most references to Lasswell are perfunctory or, to be less generous, superficial, ornamental, even irrelevant. The addition of Lasswell's name to a text, a footnote, or a bibliography does not substantively contribute to an author's argument. The worst and most common offenders have simply quoted what is taken to be Lasswell's definition of politics—"who gets what, when, and how"—and then blithely moved on to their particular concern. For example: "Any attempt to remove politics from the reorganization process, however, is bound to fail. Politics, as Harold Lasswell opined, is the process that determines who gets what, when, and how. The reorganization act neither eliminates nor diminishes politics; it merely alters the rules..." (Fisher & Moe 1981:310). Another example deals with an approach to the study of municipal services. "It focuses on the levels of municipal services provided to different groups in the metropolis. Rooted in the academic tradition of Harold Lasswell's definition of politics, the attention to 'who gets what' in public service is termed the study of service distribution" (Jones et al 1978:333). A third case uses Lasswell's name in a manner that is largely gratuitous. "Years ago, Harold Lasswell defined politics as 'the study of influence and the influential.' But we have arbitrarily narrowed the discipline of political science to the study of government. Perhaps we should reconsider Professor Lasswell's advice and rededicate ourselves to the study of the origins of public policy..." (Dye 1978:330–31).

Suggestive Influence

A cousin of the perfunctory reference to Lasswell's legacy is the "suggestive influence" of his ideas. These references or citations are more contextual (i.e. connected to the whole of Lasswell's text) and directly related to an author's research or theoretical argument. They are "suggestions" from Lasswell used for an author's own purposes, rather than literal attributions drawn from some single module in the Lasswellian legacy.

Our first example is of the suggestive influence of Lasswell's *Power and Personality* (1948a). One researcher, concerned with the influence of self-esteem on judicial decision making, pointed out that "the process is somewhat more complex than envisaged by Lasswell," clearly stimulated by the Lasswellian postulate that office seeking may be a compensatory device for overcoming low self-esteem (Gibson 1981:105–6).

"Unconventional political behavior" has rarely been a major item on the agenda of mainstream political science. Of the "early" political behavioralists, only Lasswell concerned himself with such problems as violence, coercion, corruption, protest, and legitimacy as topics for systematic study. That his work in this area is suggestive, especially his examination of the difficult-to-research topic of corruption, is to be expected. The following example illustrates what we consider suggestive influence.

Definitions of political corruption based on notions of the public or common interest significantly broaden the range of behavior one might investigate. Consider the definition proposed by Arnold Rogow and Harold Lasswell: "A corrupt act violates responsibility toward at least one system of public or civic order and is in fact incompatible with (destructive of) any such system" [Rogow & Lasswell 1963:132–33]. While this definition focuses our attention on any act or set of acts which threaten to destroy a political system, the researcher has the responsibility of determining what the public or common interest is before assessing whether a particular act is corrupt. (Peters & Welch 1978:975)

A final example of suggestive influence stems from Lasswell's writings on epistemology and methodology. In this case, an author reported the familiar allegation that the historical study of political theory was inimical to "the development of modern scientific political theory" (Sabia 1984:985). A footnote then illustrated his argument by referring to a string of scholars—Merriam, Catlin, Munro, Lasswell, Dahl, and perhaps Easton—who presumably held this view.⁵ He then quoted Lasswell from as obscure a source as one could find: "Lasswell's comments are typical: In the recent past, said he, historians

⁵The author qualifies his statement in the case of Easton, suggesting that he might be interpreted differently. He seems not to know that Merriam (1903, 1920) and Catlin (1939) wrote ponderous works on the history of political theory.

of political theory 'were so weighed down with the burden of genteel erudition that they had little intellectual energy left with which to evolve original theory.... Hence empirical work in political science received a minimum of constructive aid from scholars formally responsible for political theory' [Lasswell 1954:201]" (Sabia 1984:985–86). But the quotation is neither "typical" of the other scholars named nor representative of the argument it was presumably designed to illustrate. Instead, it seems to have served the author as a negative catalyst.

Thus, as these quotations demonstrate, something in one or another of Lasswell's writings can suggest an idea or concern to a later author, even if neither Lasswell nor the author originally had that idea or concern in mind.⁶

Critical Appraisal

Some authors have engaged in a more or less careful and judicious evaluation—whether positive or negative—of some aspect of Lasswell's work. Unlike a perfunctory or suggestive reference, critical analysis entails a serious look at the substance of Lasswell's ideas. This critical appraisal may result in the adoption, adaptation, or rejection of his legacy.

The silliest critique of Lasswell characterized him as "that notorious radical skeptic" among an earlier generation of political scientists, including Woodrow Wilson and Charles Beard. These gentlemen, compared with the later devotees of "relevance" in political science, were "much more interested in shaping and guiding the public agenda through the authority of the new discipline and its research products" (Seidelman 1990:598). Lasswell may have been notorious and certainly was radical, but, by the evidence of the quoted statement itself, a skeptic he was not.

Worse than silly due to its bald inaccuracy is this sweeping, polemical characterization of the "behavioral generation," including such scholars as Almond and Key, as atheoretical: "Even Lasswell, the most theoretically inclined of that generation—probably the most erudite—did not sit down and write a theoretical work. His publications were empirical (e.g. *Psychopathology and Politics* [1960]), encyclopedic (*Power and Society* [1950]), or methodological..." (Lowi 1988:886). This author's conception of "theory" and empiricism are so idiosyncratic as to draw the reader away from a significant portion of Lasswell's opus.

A less objectionable evaluation concerns the overquoted, even overheated, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How*. Werlin (1990) was not altogether off base in trying to link what is sometimes called "interest group pluralism" to

⁶A few references to Lasswell are neither perfunctory nor suggestive; they are only bibliographical. Frequently appearing in a footnote, these mentions of Lasswell's writings are simply part of a string of literature citations.

Lasswell's book. "To see politics in this way is as misleading as to see the Olympics as nothing more than competing individuals and teams, neglecting the organizational arrangements and consensus on rules..." (Werlin 1990: 251). One might say "amen," were it not for the fact that Lasswell's conception of politics—perhaps we should say "conceptions"—went far beyond the "who gets what, when, how" formula, a fact that most of those appropriating the phrase rarely acknowledge.

But other critical appraisals of Lasswell's legacy are more thoughtful. For example, Lane observed that the American public values wealth more than power and that this "is the threat to Lasswell's plural-valued man that is most significant.... [W]here the market is dominant over other value-giving institutions, eroding their value positions, employing its superior resources against them, these other institutions cannot give sustenance to the plural values of the citizen, starving, in effect, Lasswellian man" (1978:24). Similarly, Sears & Lau (1983) noted that social scientists "from Lasswell (1930) on" have found that voters disguise their self-interested behavior by claiming to act in the public interest. They continued: "However, our interpretation would turn Lasswell on his head: people seem instead to claim to be self-interested...." (Sears & Lau 1983:247). These are both significant critiques of Lasswell's early psychological formulations.

Extension or Test

The most significant and exciting use of Lasswell's legacy is the attempt to extend his theories or methods to new areas of political research. When scholars apply a Lasswellian concept, method, or theory to their own research concerns, they are doing two things. First, they are implicitly, if not explicitly, affirming the validity of Lasswell's work as it stands. Second, they are testing whether that validity is maintained in a different context. An intellectual legacy could not hope for a better use, and Lasswell's has warranted several examples.

Baas (1979) examined Lasswell's displacement hypothesis in an intensive, one-subject study of the constitution as a secondary-world symbol. He found that "[t]he entire pattern of [the research subject] Smith's object world can be explained by some variant of Lasswell's theory" (Baas 1979:110). Other authors used Lasswell's distinction between inducements and constraints in an effort to "disaggregate" corporatism (Collier & Collier 1979), correlated Lasswell's psychological understanding of "political man" with human biochemical markers (Madsen 1985), incorporated Lasswell and Kaplan's distinction between "welfare" and "deference" values into a collective-goods analysis of neighborhood organizations (Rich 1980), and applied Lasswell's psychological profile of a democracy's ruling elite to Harry Truman, born to the middle class (Hamby 1991).

Of course, sometimes tests succeed by disproving a theory, and Lasswell's legacy has experienced this use too. In their research into the psychological motives of state and local politicians, Clarke & Donovan (1980:542,545) found that

[h]igh-esteem politicians are attracted to power because it allows them to control events and move people—not, it appears, because it serves as compensation against estimates of the self as 'unloved, shameful, guilty, and weak,' as Lasswell claimed (1948, p. 45)....There was, again, no evidence that this group exercises power as compensation, as Lasswell (1930, 1948) suggested in his earlier work. To the contrary, this group finds little emotional solace in the exercise of power, and public life makes them uncomfortable.

Deferential Posture

Some references to Lasswell simply pay tribute to his brilliance and entrepreneurship. He is honored for his theoretical achievements, his historical importance at a critical turning point in the social sciences, his disciplinary vision, his methodological contributions, his inspirational activities. Here is an example of the respect accorded him by those who knew him best, from a discussion of rationality in human behavior by the discipline's only Nobel prize winner: "But [the reader] may feel that I have not gone far enough in my skepticism about reason in political behavior. Surely even the concept of bounded rationality does not capture the whole role of passion and unreason in human affairs. Don't we need to listen to Lasswell and Freud as well as to Wallas and James? Assuredly we do" (Simon 1985:301). Some accolades are perverse, in that Lasswell is being lauded for work with which the author does not agree. We consider this a tribute nevertheless. In a defense of the rationality of voter turnout, Jackman (1993:279) argued that "[d]espite the plausibility of this [rational choice] perspective, casting political behavior as rational continues to generate considerable resistance.... Since at least Lasswell (1930), many have preferred to see political behavior as motivated by subconscious nonrational drives without purpose. The impact on the field of Lasswell's emphasis on the psychopathology of politics has been monumental in this regard." A third author compared Lasswell's conceptual precision unfavorably to more recent theorists of legitimacy: "...[these] problems have been exacerbated by the lack of explicit distinction in the usage of the terms *interest* and *value*, particularly since Lasswell 1959 [sic]"⁷ (Razi 1990:72; emphasis in original).

Linked with such homages to Lasswell's accomplishments are appeals to Lasswell as a learned authority. As the innovative and prolific developer of a comprehensive theory of political behavior, Lasswell is used to give authors'

⁷Actually Lasswell 1936.

arguments the weight of his mastery. This use is more than a eulogistic acknowledgement of his work; it incorporates the validity of his legacy into another writer's work. In the 1970s, for example, when community studies pursuing Dahl's question, "Who Governs?," had proved inconclusive and "a new generation of community studies...focused on outcomes" rather than decision making, one such study asserted, "Although this [new] literature is little more than a decade old, its roots are firmly based in Harold Lasswell's definition of politics: Who gets what, when, and how" (Boyle & Jacobs 1982:372). Since Lasswell's conception of politics was taken to be superior to others, this claim implied that these latter-day community studies were credible and promising. Similarly, Baldwin (1978:1231) blamed the incompleteness of exchange theorists' concept of power on their inattention to Lasswell (and Dahl): "Obviously, the exchange theorists use a narrower concept of power than Dahl does. It is interesting to note that neither Blau (1964) nor Homans (1964) cites Dahl (1957, 1968) or Lasswell and Kaplan (1950)." Because they don't use Lasswell, it was hinted, their theories are suspect.

COMING FULL CIRCLE

Some 60 years ago, in its June 1935 issue, the staid *American Political Science Review* carried what has probably remained the most devastating critique of a book (namely *World Politics and Personal Insecurity*) ever to appear in its pages. A few sentences convey the review's aroma:

....In this excellently printed, tempestuous, and obstreperous volume, Dr. Lasswell leaps about the cosmos of sociological-psychobiological-obstetrical-psychiatric political science with the abandon of a flock of sparrows at a horse-show. The title may seem to include everything from here to there, but the book actually does so, and with a rattling fusilade of partially related footnotes.....What this book contributes is the author's modernist-cubist anfractuositities of dialectical metaphysic. It is hard to see how our universities can help our laboring, lumbering democracy by telling people what they know in language they will not understand, and burdened by a cluttering universality of casual allusion. There is an adequate index. (Whittlesey 1935:500-1)

There is one truth in this polemic: Lasswell was his own worst messenger and representative. He is difficult to read and understand, which is ironic because he saw himself as a herald of a better world. Understanding him requires a willingness to learn his language, patience in letting his formulations sink in, sympathy with his intentions and goals, and a readiness not to take every one of his words at face value. Much commentary along these lines was published in his lifetime (e.g. Smith 1969, Marvick 1977, Muth 1990); to repeat it here would be redundant.

Our look at the uses made of Lasswell's work in the mainstream journals since his death shows that, just as he was an enigma to the "traditional" political scientists during his early decades, so he has remained an enigma to contemporary political scientists, with one difference: Whereas in the 1930s and 1940s he could be easily ignored as a cocky upstart whose verbal effusions would fade away, his latter-day status as a kind of patron of avant-garde disciplinary discourse makes his works count even as they seem to elude serious understanding. After considering how his legacy has been received in mainstream political science, we suspect that many of those who quote his most popular adages or maxims do not really know the works in which they appear.

APPENDIX

Our detailed inspection of the uses to which Lasswell's contributions have been put in the research and writings of his legatees took place in several steps. We used JSTOR to access the following mainstream journals: *American Political Science Review*, the *American (Midwest) Journal of Political Science*, the *Journal of Politics*, *Political Science Quarterly*, and *World Politics*. We first examined all references to Lasswell's name in articles published in the 17 years after his death (actually after his stroke in December 1977, which ended his scholarly career and permitted us to include the 1978 calendar year). The 17-year span was dictated by the fact that the current JSTOR inventory ceases after 1994.

To get a handle on the number of references, we made two comparisons. First, we looked at the articles in which his name appeared in the 17 years prior to his year of death, taking us back to 1961. Then we compared these two 17-year ranges with the equivalent ones for EE Schattschneider (who died in 1971). We chose Schattschneider because he was Lasswell's close academic contemporary, following him, for instance, in the presidency of the American Political Science Association (Lasswell, 1955–1956; Schattschneider, 1956–1957). In our primitive calculations, Schattschneider unexpectedly outdistanced Lasswell. In the 17 years after their respective deaths, Schattschneider's name appears in 127 articles, Lasswell's in only 70. (In this comparison we omitted *World Politics* because Schattschneider is referenced in it only four times over the entire period of 34 years.) Looking at the 17 years prior to their deaths, it appears that Lasswell's "stock" went down (from 206 to 70 references) while Schattschneider's went up (from 73 to 127). Although we could speculate about intellectual and contextual factors that might account for this "interesting" result, we do not make much of these nonvital statistics.

Our second step was to classify the potpourri of topics in the JSTOR-provided articles, paying some attention to the relative incidence of the differ-

ent interests of Lasswell's legatees. Here are our roughly defined topics and multiply-coded counts:

1. Conventional politics and political behavior or institutions: Theory and/or research on political participation, voting behavior, legislatures and legislative behavior, representation, administrative structures and decision making, and so on ($N = 8$).
2. Unconventional politics and political behavior: Theory and/or research on issues of legitimacy, corruption, coercion, violence, revolution, etc ($N = 6$).
3. Social and/or political change: Theory and/or research on time and developmental constructs such as world revolutionary change, garrison state, elite circulation, skill revolution, symbol transformation, etc ($N = 12$).
4. Political processes: Theory and/or research on power situations, exchange, bargaining, rational choice, decision making, conflict, communication, professionalization, group identification, etc ($N = 8$).
5. Public policy: Theory and/or research on substantive policy arenas (e.g. foreign affairs, welfare), "policy science," politics and economics, the "good regime," etc ($N = 7$).
6. Political psychology: Theory and/or research on "human nature," political personality, "perspective" (identifications, demands, expectations), socialization, interpersonal relations, attitudes, political culture, values and value orientations, etc ($N = 22$).
7. International and comparative politics: Theory and/or research on "the state" (as interaction and/or "subjective event"), diplomacy, international law, etc ($N = 3$).
8. Analytic theory, methodology and epistemology: Theory and/or research on political science as discipline, education, causation, contextual analysis, configurative analysis, "individual and society," value-institutional approach, etc ($N = 16$).

Finally and most importantly, we categorized the ways in which Lasswell's ideas, concepts, formulas, approaches and so on seem to have been used. After a good deal of "mental experimentation" with categories and subcategories, we arrived at the five used above. Here we again provide our rough counts (including multiple codings) without vouching for their eternal reliability: (a) Perfunctory ($N = 27$); (b) Suggestive ($N = 20$); (c) Critical ($N = 11$); (d) Extending ($N = 8$); and (e) Deferential ($N = 9$). Before our "field research" through the grasslands of the JSTOR system, we had naively hoped to be able to crosstabulate the eight topical groupings with these five analytical catego-

Table 1 References to Lasswell in books published since 1978 in the field of American politics

Subject Matter	Number of Books	Number Mentioning Lasswell
Political behavior and public opinion	8	4
Political parties and national politics	7	1
Elite and class	5	1
Presidency and Cabinet	4	1
Voting and electoral behavior	4	2
Congress and legislative behavior	4	0
Democracy and political values	10	0
Interest groups and organizations	4	2
Race relations	2	0
Rational and public choice	10	0
Information processing	3	0
Total	61	11

ries. We were quickly cured of our naivete as we encountered one of the social scientist's worst nightmares—the “many variables, few cases” problem. As we ended up with 40 cells but only 75 usable references, our noble intentions had to be jettisoned.

Just to assure ourselves that Lasswell's low profile in the journals is not a fluke, we looked at 61 books published since 1978 in the broad field of American politics, casually pulled down from our personal library shelves. What we found was even more stultifying than the results of the journals survey. Overall, of the 61 books, an appalling 50 had no references to Lasswell in either their indices or bibliographies. Table 1 shows the breakdown by topics.

Perusal of the 11 “ordained” books reveals that only three authors made creative use of some fundamental part of the Lasswellian legacy. The rest of the references are as inane as those found in the journals, being perfunctory or explicative, unnecessary to the author's point.

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CONTENTS

STUDYING THE PRESIDENCY, <i>Nigel Bowles</i>	1
DETERRENCE AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates, <i>Paul K. Huth</i>	25
ENDING REVOLUTIONS AND BUILDING NEW GOVERNMENTS, <i>Arthur L. Stinchcombe</i>	49
HAROLD D. LASSWELL'S LEGACY TO MAINSTREAM POLITICAL SCIENCE: A Neglected Agenda, <i>Heinz Eulau, Susan Zlomke</i>	75
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, <i>Helen V. Milner</i>	91
WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT DEMOCRATIZATION AFTER TWENTY YEARS, <i>Barbara Geddes</i>	115
ELECTORAL RULES AND ELECTORAL COORDINATION, <i>G. Cox</i>	145
TERM LIMITS, <i>Bruce E. Cain, Marc A. Levin</i>	163
MISPERCEPTIONS ABOUT PERCEPTUAL BIAS, <i>Alan Gerber, Donald Green</i>	189
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS, <i>Peter D. Feaver</i>	211
POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY, <i>S. C. Stokes</i>	243
THE ROCHESTER SCHOOL: The Origins of Positive Political Theory, <i>S. M. Amadae, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita</i>	269
BOUNDED RATIONALITY, <i>Bryan D. Jones</i>	297
THE DECAY AND BREAKDOWN OF COMMUNIST ONE-PARTY SYSTEMS, <i>Stathis N. Kalyvas</i>	323
ISAIAH BERLIN: Political Theory and Liberal Culture, <i>Alan Ryan</i>	345
ISAIAH BERLIN (1909–1997), <i>Noel Annan</i>	363
HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS, <i>Kathleen Thelen</i>	369
EFFECTS OF INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS ON POLITICAL STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA, <i>Subrata Kumar Mitra</i>	405
INSTITUTIONALISM AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: Beyond International Relations and Comparative Politics, <i>J. Jupille, J. A. Caporaso</i>	429
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM, <i>Byron E. Shafer</i>	445
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY FROM A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE, <i>Sergio Fabbrini</i>	465
COPING WITH TRAGEDIES OF THE COMMONS, <i>Elinor Ostrom</i>	493
DEMOCRACY AND DICHOTOMIES: A Pragmatic Approach to Choices about Concepts, <i>David Collier, Robert Adcock</i>	537